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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Docket No. 18125 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Conservator of the Estate 
of John E. Boyer to have two Quit-Claim Deeds declared void and 
vacated based on the grounds that John E. Boyer, one of the 
grantors of those deeds, was incompetent at the time of their 
execution. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Following trial before the Court, the Honorable David B. 
Dee found that John E. Boyer was competent at the time of the 
execution of the deeds and therefore rendered judgment for 
Defendants and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek this Court's affirmance of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John E. Boyer and Eva B. Boyer, who is now deceased, were 
husband and wife. Plaintiff-Appellant Kathryn C. Williams, who 
is a daughter of John and Eva Boyer, is also the Conservator of 
the Estate of John E. Boyer. Defendant-Respondent Michael 
Boyer is a son of John and Eva Boyer. (R. 235--testirnony of 
Michael Boyer) Defendant-Respondent Danny Gene Boyer is a 
grandson of and was raised by John and Eva Boyer. (R. 260, 
261--testimony of Danny Gene Boyer). 
In December, 1960, and again in January, 1981, John Boyer 
was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease. (R. 129, 131, 
133-34--testimony of Moench) This is a disease of the 
premature degeneration of the cerebral cortex of the brain, a 
process of degeneration quite similar to senile dementia as is 
seen in advanced age. (R. 133-34, 144--testimony of Moench) 
On June 6, 1961, John Boyer was admitted for treatment to the 
Utah State Hospital and on January 4, 1963, he returned home to 
reside on a home visit until his release from the hospital on 
April 30, 1964. (R. 91, 93--testimony of Elliott) 
John and Eva Boyer owned as joint tenants two pieces of 
property which are the subject of this lawsuit. Their home is 
located on one of the properties at 875 Glendale Street 
(hereinafter called the "house property"). The other property 
-2-
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which is adjacent to the house property contained a garage 
which is known as Lots 4 and 5, Block 5, Glendale Addition 
(hereinafter called the "garage property"). 
On May 14, 1976, John and Eva Boyer executed a will which 
was prepared by Wayne Ashworth, an attorney practicing in Salt 
Lake City. {R. 95, 96--testimony of Ashworth) Under the will, 
the Defendant Michael Boyer was to receive the house property 
and Defendant Danny Gene Boyer was to receive the garage 
property. 
John Boyer was concerned that the will would have to be 
probated and he inquired of Mr. Ashworth if there were a way to 
avoid probate. {R. 99, 104--testimony of Ashworth) Mr. 
Ashworth advised Mr. Boyer that he may avoid probate by deeding 
the property to Michael and Danny. In response to Mr. Boyer's 
request, Mr. Ashworth prepared deeds to the properties. (R. 
104--testimony of Ashworth) On May 18, 1976, John and Eva 
Boyer executed two Quit-Claim Deeds, one conveying the house 
property to Michael Boyer and the other conveying the garage 
property to Danny Gene Boyer. (Exhibits 4, 5; R. 
103-05--testimony of Ashworth) Both deeds contained a 
reservation of life estate to John and Eva Boyer. (R. 
106-07--testimony of Ashworth) John Boyer recorded the deed to 
Michael Boyer. (R. 105--testimony of Ashworth) Wayne Ashworth 
recorded the deed to Danny Gene Boyer. (R. 108--testimony of 
Ashworth) Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer did not request 
or encourage the preparation of the deeds. They did not even 
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know that the Boyers contemplated conveying the properties. 
Michael first found out about the deeds approximately two years 
after they were executed in February of 1978 when his mother 
showed them to him. (R. 246--testimony of Michael Boyer) 
Shortly after that time, Danny Gene Boyer for the first time 
also heard about the deed to him. (R. 265-66--testimony of 
Danny Gene Boyer). 
On April 19, 1978, Plaintiff Kathryn C. Williams was 
appointed Conservator of the Estate of John E. Boyer. (Exhibit 
7; R. 149--testimony of Kathryn c. Williams) She initiated 
suit against Defendants to avoid and cancel the deeds on the 
grounds that John Boyer lacked sufficient capacity to convey 
property and Defendants fraudulently procured the signature of 
John Boyer on the deeds. (R. 2-4--Plaintiff 's Complaint) At 
trial the parties stipulated to strike the fraud allegation. 
(R. 233) In rendering judgment for Defendants, the trial court 
found that John Boyer did have and possess sufficient legal 
capacity to execute and deliver the deeds and that the deeds 
were validly executed and delivered. (R. 74--Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law) The Plaintiff appeals from that 
judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in finding that 
John Boyer had sufficient legal capacity to execute and deliver 
the deeds and in placing the burden on the Plaintiff to prove 
the invalidity of the deeds. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT JOHN BOYER HAD 
SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding 
that John Boyer had sufficient capacity to execute and deliver 
the deeds. Since this is an action in equity, this Court may 
review the evidence; however, the Court must take into account 
the advantaged position of the trial judge and should only 
reverse when the evidence clearly preponderates against his 
decision. Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978); Chugg 
v. Chugg, 9 Utah 2d 256, 342 P.2d 875 (1959). In Del Porto v. 
Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this action to avoid 
deeds is one in equity upon which this Court has both the 
prerogative and duty to review and weigh the evidence, and 
to determine the facts. However, in the practical 
application of that rule is well established in our own 
decisional law that due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, in close proximity to the parties and the 
witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of correctness 
of his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they were in error; and where the 
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings 
merely because we may have reviewed the matter differently, 
but do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against 
them. 
The time of the execution of the deed is the material or 
critical point of time to be considered upon the inquiry as to 
the grantor's capacity. Stringfellow v. Hanson, 25 Utah 480, 
71 Pac. 1052 (1903). 
-5-
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The Utah Supreme Court has on a number of times defined the 
test to determine whether the grantor has sufficient capacity 
to make a deed. 
The test whether grantor had sufficient mental capacity to 
make a deed is: Were mental faculties so deficient or 
impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend 
the subject of the deed, its nature and its probable 
consequences, and to act with discretion in relation 
thereto, or with relation to ordinary affairs of life? 
Peterson v. Carter, supra at 331; accord: Anderson v. Thomas, 
108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142, 146 {1945); O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 
Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 772 {1934); Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 
103, 71 P.2d 185 {1937). 
In Stringfellow, supra, at 1054, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
discussing the mental capacity of the grantor, stated: 
The test is, has the party at the time sufficient reason 
and mental capacity to understand the nature of the 
contract he is entering into, and to realize and appreciate 
the probable results of the transaction? If so, he would 
be bound by his acts, and equity, in the absence of fraud 
and mistake, will not relieve him from his bargain, however 
unreasonable, in the judgment, of others, it may appear to 
be. 
It is clear from the test as announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court, there is not a two-part test in determining the capacity 
of the granter as the Appellant seems to argue. There does not 
have to be both a finding of capacity to convey property and of 
sufficient capacity to form the intent to transfer property as 
is required under the doctrine of delivery as Appellant 
argues. Inherent in the test to determine the capacity of the 
granter to convey is that he understands the nature and the 
probable 
-6-
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consequences of a deed. Thus, the grantor must have the intent 
to convey the property to meet this test. 
Courts have generally construed the competency requirement 
liberally, demonstrating the difficulty in determining who in 
this society composed of individuals of varying personalities 
and levels of intelligence has the sufficient mental faculties 
to conduct his own affairs. In Stringfellow, supra, at 1055, 
the court stated: 
Even if his mind were weak and debilitated, compared to 
what it had been, his demeanor on occasion eccentric, and 
even if he had not capacity to transact general business, 
yet if he understood, as he clearly did, the nature of that 
particular act--recollect the property he was disposing of, 
and the person to whom he is giving it, and how he desired 
to dispose of it--has enough to make his act valid. 
In Chugg, supra, the court noted that it was not to be 
questioned that the plaintiff's evidence in that case standing 
alone would be sufficient to support a finding that the granter 
was incompetent, at least at some times during which the 
questioned transactions occurred. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that "there is ample basis therein upon which to 
reject plaintiff's contention that he had proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that Nathan Chugg [the grantor] was neither 
incompetent or a victim of undue influence." 432 P.2d at 878. 
In Peterson, supra, Mrs. Peterson, a 91-year-old woman 
living in a rest home, conveyed her home and underlying real 
property to others. Subsequently, a guardian was appointed 
over the person and estate of Mrs. Peterson and he brought suit 
to vacate the deed based on the grantor's incompetence and 
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undue influence in connection with the conveyance. The trial 
court refused to vacate the deed and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]rrespective 
of Mrs. Peterson's competency now, or even before the 
conveyance, substantial evidence was introduced to show that at 
the time of the conveyance, Mrs. Peterson knew and understood 
the nature of the transaction." 579 P.2d at 331. The attorney 
who was asked to assist in completing the transaction testified 
that after having talked with Mrs. Peterson and after her 
various questions about the effect of the sale had been 
answered; "there was no question in my mind that she knew what 
she was doing and she wanted the home to go to Mr. and Mrs. 
Carter." 579 P.2d at 331. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although other testimony might show Mrs. Peterson's 
incompetence, we are inclined to defer to the trial court's 
decision due to his proximity to the situation and his 
ability to observe the witnesses and their demeanor. 
579 P.2d at 331. 
As in Peterson, supra, the attorney involved in the 
transactions in the instant case also testified concerning 
those transactions. Wayne Ashworth, a member of the Utah State 
Bar, prepared a will for John and Eva Boyer and that will was 
executed on May 14, 1976. (R. 94, 95, 96, 101--testimony of 
Ashworth) Wayne Ashworth and his secretary, Carol Barbury, 
were witnesses to the will. (R. 97--testimony of Ashworth) 
Defendant Michael Boyer and his wife, Jaylene Boyer, were to 
receive under the will the house property and Danny Gene Boyer 
was to receive the garage property. (R. 100--testimony of 
Ashworth). 
-8-
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The Boyers had come into Ashworth's office on May 10, 1976, 
when Ashworth was not in and left the information they wanted 
in the will with his secretary, Carol Barbury. (R. 
95--testimony of Ashworth) Mr. Ashworth called Mr. Boyer 
before preparing the will to make sure that he wanted it the 
way he had stated to his secretary. He had talked to Mr. Boyer 
a couple of times on the phone. (R. 99-110--testimony of 
Ashworth). 
Mr. Ashworth testified that at the time of signing of the 
will, Mr. Boyer appeared normal and was interested in the 
transaction. 
Q. (By Mr. Weston) Directing your attention, Mr. 
Ashworth, to the time you were here signing the will with 
Mr. and Mrs. Boyer in the presence of Mrs. Jensen [maiden 
name for Mrs. Barbury], did you observe anything at that 
time about Mr. Boyer's condition? 
A. No. He appeared normal to me. 
Q. At any time during that meeting do you recall that Mr. 
Boyer did anything or said anything that seemed unusual to 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. How did he appear as far as being interested in or 
alert to what was going on at the time? 
A. Well, he appeared to know what he wanted about that, 
because I thought to myself, •why is he giving it to his 
grandson?" I didn't ask him why, but I thought that was a 
little unusual. I thought if that was his wishes, I'd put 
that in the will. 
(R. 101--testimony of Ashworth) 
Mr. Ashworth also testified that at the time of the signing 
of the will, Mr. Boyer appeared to be sound of mind. 
Q. At the time Mr. Boyer signed the will on this occasion, 
did you then form any opinion about his soundness of mind? 
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A. No. Not really. I mean, he appeared of sound mind to 
me. You know, if he had acted a little bit funny or 
something like that, I would have had some reservations 
about him signing the will the way it was made up. 
Q. Did you have any reservations? 
A. None whatsoever. 
Q. Based on what you saw and heard? 
A. No. 
Q. What is your opinion as to whether he was sound of mind 
and understood what he was doing? 
A. I think he was mentally sound at the time he signed 
it. There was nothing to indicate to me that he was 
anything else but. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not he knew he 
was signing a will? 
A. I'm sure he did, because I talked to him after we got 
the information on the form. I had a couple of phone calls 
from him to discuss it. 
Q. Do you recall what he said at that time? 
A. No, I don't recall. It was--after I read the note that 
the secretary had taken, I had a couple of questions I 
wanted to ask him. So I did call him to make sure that 
that's the way he wanted it. Like I said before, it seemed 
a little unusual that he was going to give it to this one 
child and the grandson. so I called him back to fully 
discuss this with him and asked if that was the way he 
wanted it. 
Q. Was that before or after he signed the will? 
A. That was before. 
Q. In your opinion did he know who his heirs were at that 
time? 
A. Well, he--I would--! think he must have done, because 
he gave me all of their names. 
(R. 102-103--testirnony of Ashworth) 
Mr. Ashworth testified that Mr. Boyer read the will and 
asked whether the will would have to be probated. He wanted to 
make certain that two children would 
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property. (R. 99--testimony of Ashworth) Mr. Boyer asked if 
there was any way he could get out of probate, and Mr. Ashworth 
advised him that there is a possibility to avoid probate by 
deeding the property to the children and reserving a life 
estate to Mr. Boyer. In response to Mr. Boyer's request, Mr. 
Ashworth prepared the deeds conveying the house property to 
Michael Boyer and the garage property to Danny Gene Boyer. The 
deeds were executed by John and Eva Boyer on May 18, 1976, four 
days after the Boyers had signed the will. (Exhibits 4, and 
5). The deeds were notarized by Mr. Ashworth and witnessed by 
Carol Barbury. (R. 104--testimony of Ahsworth) 
Mr. Ashworth testified that in his opinion there is no 
question that Mr. Boyer had capacity to sign the deeds. 
Q. (By Mr. Weston) Directing your attention, Mr. 
Ashworth, to the time that these deeds were executed in the 
Boyer home, did you observe anything about Mr. Boyer at the 
time that was unusual in his conduct? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did he appear to be interested and attentive to what 
was going on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you concerned, to the best you can recall at this 
late date, were you concerned at that time as to whether he 
understood what he was signing? Do you understand my 
question? 
A. Give me that question again. 
Q. Reflecting back on what you observed at the time, did 
you then have any concern as to whether Mr. Boyer really 
understood what he was signing? 
A. No, I didn't. Not for a minute. I didn't have any 
question about his capacity to sign. 
(R. 108--testimony of Ashworth) 
-11-
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Carol Barbury, Mr. Ashworth's secretary who had taken the 
information initially from the Boyers concerning the will, also 
testified that Mr. Boyer understood the will and was perfectly 
sound of mind at the time of the execution of the will. 
Q. Directing your attention to the time that the will was 
signed--this, as I understand, was in your office, is that 
correct--in Mr. Ashworth's office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall at all the demeanor that Mr. Boyer had at 
that time? Did he appear to be alert and interested? 
A. Yes, he was. 
Q. Do you know whether he read the will before he signed 
it? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. You saw him read it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything about what Mr. Boyer said or what he 
did that gave you any concern as to whether he really 
understood what he was doing? 
A. No. 
Q. From what you observed, did you at that time frame any 
opinion as to whether he was sound of mind and understood 
what he was doing? 
A. He seemed to be perfectly sound of mind and understood just what he was doing. 
Q. You've had no concern--
A. No. 
Q. --with what you saw and observed then? 
A. No. 
(R. 118-19--testimony of Barbury) 
-12-
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Additionally, Mrs. Barbury testified that Mr. Boyer was 
alert and attentive at the time of signing of the deeds. 
Q. Directing your attention to the time that the deeds 
were signed at the Boyer home, in that same regard did Mr. 
Boyer on that occasion appear to be alert, attentive, and 
interested in what was going on? 
A. Yes. He seemed to be very relieved to sign the deed to 
know it was going to be the way he wanted it. 
Q. Do you recall discussing the deeds with Mr. Boyer at 
that time or hearing any discussion at that time with Mr. 
Boyer? 
A. I don't recall the exact conversation no. It is just 
that--the thing I do recall is that he said: "Now, this 
should take care of everything. This should put it the way 
I want it." And Mr. Ashworth said, 'It should.' Other 
than that, I don't recall, no. 
Q. Do you recall on that occasion at the home when the 
deeds were being signed Mr. Boyer saying or doing anything 
to give you any impression or concern as to whether he 
really understood what he was doing? 
A. No he didn't. 
(R. 119-20--testimony of Barbury) 
Joseph Kankelborg, who is the son-of-law of John and Eva 
Boyer, testified that in May of 1976 he was at the Boyer home 
for a birthday party for his daughter and at that time John 
Boyer told him that he had gone to the lawyer to sign papers 
that had given Michael the home and Danny the property in 
back. (R. 310-311--testimony of Joseph Kankelborg). Richard 
Kankelborg testified that at that time John Boyer knew his name 
and he knew whether or not he owned his house. Kankelborg did 
not find Mr. Boyer's behavior socially unacceptable or socially 
unusual. (R. 313--testimony of Kankelborg) Michael Boyer 
testified that in May of 1976 John Boyer knew where he was 
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living and who his children were. (R. 244-45--testimony of 
Michael Boyer) John Boyer had cared for his wife, Eva, after 
her stroke between 1972 to 1978. He gave her medication, 
washed the clothes, did the general housework and made the 
meals. (R. 247--testimony of Michael Boyer). 
Danny Boyer testified that he did not notice anything about 
John Boyer's conduct or his activities t~at made him doubt 
about his mental competency. (R. 268--testimony of Danny Gene 
Boyer). Sherry Lynn Kankelborg, daughter of John and Eva 
Boyer, testified that John Boyer understood who he was, where 
he lived and whether he owned his own home. (R. 296--testimony 
of Sherry Lynn Kankelborg) She also testified that John 
Boyer's behavior was socially appropriate. (R. 
296-97--testimony of Kankelborg) Marilyn Rosemary Boyer, 
another daughter of John and Eva Boyer, testified that her 
testimony is the same as Michael's, Danney's and Sherry's as to 
John Boyer's competency. (R. 318--testimony of Marilyn Boyer) 
Robert Boyer, another son of John and Eva Boyer, testified that 
his testimony would be the same as Michael's, Danny's and 
Sherry's as to the recollection and understanding of John Boyer 
of the circumstances around him. (R. 324--testimony of Robert 
Boyer) 
Dr. Moench, a psychiatrist, testified that he had examined 
John Boyer in December of 1960 and again in January of 1981 and 
he concluded that Mr. Boyer had an organic brain sydrome known 
as Alzheimer's disease. (R. 129-,130,133-34--testimony of 
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Moench) He gave his opinion that at the time of the signing of 
the deeds, Boyer's condition would not have been significantly 
different than at the time of the examinations and that Boyer 
wouldn't know the meaning of a legal document. (R. 
134-135--testimony of Moench). 
However, Dr. Moench did not see or examine Mr. Boyer 
between the time of the examination in December, 1960, and the 
examination in January of 1981, a 21-year gap. (R. 
135--testimony of Moench) Dr. Moench also admitted that the 
degeneration with Alzheimer's disease can take place at varying 
rates; and one cannot predict the rate of deterioration. (R. 
137--testimony of Moench) Dr. Moench also testified that with 
this type of condition, it is possible there can be a remission 
for a period of time, even a lucid interval or improvement for 
a period of time. (R. 140-141--testimony Moench) It is even 
possible that Mr. Boyer may very well have entertained a degree 
of lucidity that would have permitted him to understand the 
nature of his property and the boundaries of the same and the 
names of his heirs. (R. 142--testimony of Moench) Dr. Moench 
was not able to say with certainty that Mr. Boyer would not 
know if he owned his own home. (R. 140--testimonv of Moench) 
It is also possible though not probable that Mr. Boyer would 
have known the names of his children and would have recognized 
his children. (R. 140--testimony of Moench). 
In summary Dr. Moench could not say definitely that in May, 
1976, Mr. Boyer did not have sufficient lucidity to have 
permitted him to have knowingly executed the deeds. 
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Q. You feel his ability was impaired? And finally. the 
bottom line is that from your experience, Doctor; from what 
you have seen in the years of your practice, you were not 
able to say definitely that in May of 1976 Mr. Boyer did 
not have a sufficient lucid interval to have permitted him 
to have executed the deeds, clearly understanding the 
property that he was conveying and the individuals to whom 
those interests were being conveyed? Is that correct? 
A. No, sir. I was not there. I did not examine him at 
that time. I could only give an opinion. 
(R. 147--Testimony of Moench). 
Plaintiff and her husband testified that John Boyer was 
incompetent. The main basis for this conclusion is their 
allegation that Mr. Boyer remained in the home with his wife 
even though she was allegedly sleeping with a boarder in the 
home, Mr. Deberry. (See R. 159--testimony of Kathryn c. 
Williams; R. 174--testimony of Jack D. Williams.) Appellant's 
counsel also argues that John Boyer must have been incompetent 
if he would abandon his wife to a boarder. (See Appellant's 
Brief at 10.) The Appellant argues that the circumstances in 
the John Boyer home for the years immediately preceding the 
execution of the deeds would compel a finding of Mr. Boyer's 
incompetency. However, such ignores the evidence of a father 
who was gainfully and responsibly employed until December of 
1960 and who maintained thereafter a close and a considerate 
relationship with his family and who involved himself in the 
care of the home and his wife after she suffered a stroke in 
1972. The evidence portrays John Boyer as having a loving, 
warm and tolerant nature. It is completely without merit to 
assume, as Appellant contends, that there were improper 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circumstances existing in John Boyer's home and that Mr. 
Boyer's continuing attention and interest in his wife and 
family were to insufficient mental capacity rather than to a 
loving and forgiving nature. 
There has been substantial evidence in this case that John 
Boyer had sufficient power to comprehend the subject and nature 
of the deeds that he executed in May of 1976 and that he 
understood the consequences of the deeds. He was interested 
that Michael and Danny Gene receive the property. He did not 
want probate to pose an interference to that desire. The 
evidence is conflicting yet it does not clearly preponderate 
against the findings of the trial court which is presumed 
correct that John Boyer did have legal capacity to execute the 
deeds. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PLACED THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF OF THE INVALIDITY OF THE DEEDS UPON PLAINTIFF. 
Appellant argues that the court erred in placing the 
burden upon Plaintiff to show that the deeds were not 
authentic. It is clear that the language of that court that 
Appellant cites to in the record concerns to the burden of 
proving the competency of the grantor. The court stated that 
the Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that John Boyer was 
mentally incompetent. (R. 180-81) It is clear that the party 
attacking the competency of the granter bears the burden of 
proving his incompetency. It is presumed that the grantor in 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the deed was competent to execute it at the time of its 
execution and the burden of proving incompetency is on the 
person alleging it. O'Reilly, supra, at 772. In Chugg, supra, 
a 876 the court discussed the burden of proof in context of the 
suit to void a deed on the basis of the incompetency of a 
grantor. 
The deed and bill of sale conveying the property to Dale 
are in proper form and duly executed, and the deed is 
acknowledged and recorded. This establishes prima facie 
the genuineness of the transaction and casts upon the party 
attacking it the burden of showing invalidity of the 
documents by clear and convincing evidence. 
Appellant appears to argue that since the transaction in 
this case was between close relatives, there is a confidential 
relationship and the Respondents bear the burden of proving 
that the transaction was fair. It is true that if there is a 
confidential relationship, the superior party must prove the 
fairness of the transaction. 
If a confidential relationship is shown to exist, and a 
gift or conveyance is made to a party in a superior 
position, a presumption arises that the transaction was 
unfair; this presumption has the force of evidence and will 
itself support a finding if not over come by counterveiling 
evidence. The burden is upon the superior party to 
convince the court by a preponderance (not clear and 
convincing) of the evidence that the transaction was fair. 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 713, n. 4 
(1965). 
However, this rule is clearly inapplicable in the 
transaction involving Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer. 
Neither Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer were involved in the 
transactions in this case. They did not request or encourage 
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the preparation of the deeds. Neither knew that the deeds 
were, in fact, executed or that the Boyers even contemplated 
conveying the properties. Michael and Danny Gene first found 
out about the deeds approximately two years after they were 
executed in February of 1978. {R. 246--testimony of Michael 
Boyer; R. 265-66--testimony of Danny Gene Boyer} Clearly, a 
presumption of unfairness would not arise in this situation 
where the grantees were not involved in the transactions and 
did not even know that the transactions were developing. 
Appellant seems to argue that since Eva Boyer was in a 
confidential relationship to John Boyer, then the Defendants 
bear the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction. 
However, the rule requiring the showing of fairness would not 
apply in this situation. The purpose of the doctrine of 
confidentiality is to not allow a person in a superior position 
in a confidential relationship to unfairly benefit from that 
relationship. In this case, even if Evan Boyer were found to 
be in a confidential relation with John Boyer, she did not 
benefit from that relationship. She did not receive the 
property from Mr. Boyer. 
In Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 433, 437-38 {1914), 
the court stated: 
. • . If the courts should interfere in a transaction 
between husband and wife, or between those of parent and 
child, every time it is shown that the wife asked, or even 
coaxed, the husband to transfer property either to her or 
to one of the children or both of them, all such 
transactions must of necessity cease. such, fortunately, 
is not the law, and the courts have frequently so 
declared. 
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Even if the law of confidentiality may apply in this 
situation, Defendants have failed to prove that a confidential 
relationship existed; that John Boyer reposed confidence in Eva 
Boyer that resulted in Eva Boyer's superiority and influence 
over John Boyer. The relation of husband and wife does not in 
and of itself create any presumption of a relationship of trust 
and confidence that will cast the burden of proof to show the 
fairness of the transaction. Hatch, supra, at 438. In 
Bradbury, supra, at 713, the court stated: 
While kinship may be a factor in determining the existence 
of a legally significant confidential relatioship 
confidential relationships, there must be a showing, in 
addition to the kinship, of reposal of competence by one 
party and the resulting superiority and influence of the 
other party. The relationship must be such as would lead 
an ordinary prudent person in the management of his 
business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the 
other party which largely results in the substitution of 
the will of the latter for that of the former in material 
matters involved in the transaction. The doctrine of 
confidential relationship rests upon the principle of 
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of 
superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other. 
Mere confidence in one person by another is not sufficient 
alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence 
must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to 
create a corresponding duty, either legal or moral, upon 
the part of the other to observe the competence, and it 
must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there 
is a superior influence on one side and dependence on the 
other. 
Appellant has failed to produce any evidence which shows 
the motive or purpose of Eva Boyer in conveying the property. 
Appellant has failed to produce any evidence Eva Baver was in a 
superior position over John Boyer and that John Boyer reposed 
such confidence in Eva Boyer that Eva had any resulting 
superiority of influence over him. 
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Even if Respondents do bear the burden of showing that the 
transaction was fair, that burden has been met. John and Eva 
Boyer made a gift of property to the son and to a grandson whom 
they raised and cared for. The Boyers had a loving and caring 
relationship with the Defendants. There is no evidence that 
the transaction was unfair or improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case, even though conflicting, does 
not clearly preponderate against the trial court's finding that 
John Boyer has sufficient mental capacity to convey the 
property. Appellant bears the burden of showing John Boyer's 
incapacity. Additionally, the doctrine of confidential 
relationship does not apply to this case. If it does apply, 
there is no evidence that a confidential relationship did exist. 
s_-+, 
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